Skip to the ledger

GrantClerk

NSF award 2442759 · University of Wisconsin-Madison

CAREER: A Game Theory Framework for Decentralized Decisions in Large-Scale Discrete Optimization Problems

Final report due

29 December 2030

in 1,533 days · The award ends on 31 August 2030.

GrantClerk is a private service. We are not NSF or any government agency.

Dates this award owes

NSF emails you about this too.

  • Decide about an extension3 May 2030in 1293 days

    award ending 2030-08-31 · Research.gov

  • Extension request17 Jul 2030in 1368 days

    award ending 2030-08-31 · Research.gov

  • No-cost extension notice21 Aug 2030in 1403 days

    award ending 2030-08-31 · Research.gov

  • Final report due29 Dec 2030in 1533 days

    award ending 2030-08-31 · Research.gov

  • Project outcomes report due29 Dec 2030in 1533 days

    award ending 2030-08-31 · Research.gov

  • Award is closed out29 Dec 2030in 1533 days

    award ending 2030-08-31 · Research.gov

Annual report dates come from the budget period on your award notice. That date is not public, so it is not shown here.

How we got this date

  1. NSF lists this award's end date as 31 August 2030.
  2. NSF rules say the final report is due no later than 120 days after that.
  3. So the final report is due by 29 December 2030.

Read the rule on Research.gov

Get a note before each report date

Add this award to your desk. We email you before each date and keep the dates in one place.

Renews each year until you cancel. Cancel any time from your account.

Already a member? Sign in

Award card

Award number
2442759
Period of support
1 Sep 2025 – 31 Aug 2030
Amount
$558,786
Awardee
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI
Program
OE Operations Engineering
Directorate
ENG

Abstract

This Faculty Early Career Development Program (CAREER) grant supports research that intends to enhance decision making in decentralized systems. Decentralized decision-making naturally arises in many scenarios, notably in supply chains and transportation and logistics, where multiple self-interested agents share a finite collection of common resources and influence each other's behavior. One crucial challenge…

Is this right?

We copy this from the public NSF award record. Your award notice and NSF always win. If a date looks wrong, check Research.gov.