NSF award 2536055 · University of Maryland, College Park

A New Incentive Design Theory for Learning Agents in Federated Population Games

Final report due

28 November 2029

in 1,137 days · The award ends on 31 July 2029.

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Decide about an extension2 Apr 2029in 897 days
award ending 2029-07-31 · Research.gov
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Extension request16 Jun 2029in 972 days
award ending 2029-07-31 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “at least 45 days prior to the end date”
No-cost extension notice21 Jul 2029in 1007 days
award ending 2029-07-31 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “at least ten calendar days prior to the end date”
Final report due28 Nov 2029in 1137 days
award ending 2029-07-31 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “no later than 120-days following the end date of the award”
Project outcomes report due28 Nov 2029in 1137 days
award ending 2029-07-31 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “no later than 120 days following the end date”
Award is closed out28 Nov 2029in 1137 days
award ending 2029-07-31 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “financially closed out 120 days after their expiration date”

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How we got this date

NSF lists this award's end date as 31 July 2029.
NSF rules say the final report is due no later than 120 days after that.
So the final report is due by 28 November 2029.

Read the rule on Research.gov

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Award card

Award number: 2536055
Period of support: 15 Aug 2026 – 31 Jul 2029
Amount: $530,000
Awardee: University of Maryland, College Park, College Park, MD
Program: EPCL: Energy, Power, Control,
Directorate: ENG

Abstract

This NSF project aims to develop the scientific foundations for guiding the collective behavior of large groups of decision makers, such as drivers, consumers, and automated computer agents sharing roads, energy, supplies, and communication networks. When many participants each pursue their own goals, the overall outcome can be inefficient or unstable, as seen in traffic jams and power grid disruptions. Coordinators…

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