NSF award 2555491 · University of Alabama Tuscaloosa

Collaborative Research: SaTC 2.0: RES: Modeling and Mitigating Reflective Backscatter Side-Channel Attacks (ReBac) in Everyday Devices

Final report due

28 January 2030

in 1,198 days · The award ends on 30 September 2029.

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award ending 2029-09-30 · Research.gov
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Final report due28 Jan 2030in 1198 days
award ending 2029-09-30 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “no later than 120-days following the end date of the award”
Project outcomes report due28 Jan 2030in 1198 days
award ending 2029-09-30 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “no later than 120 days following the end date”
Award is closed out28 Jan 2030in 1198 days
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PAPPG 24-1: “financially closed out 120 days after their expiration date”

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NSF lists this award's end date as 30 September 2029.
NSF rules say the final report is due no later than 120 days after that.
So the final report is due by 28 January 2030.

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Award card

Award number: 2555491
Period of support: 1 Oct 2026 – 30 Sep 2029
Amount: $300,000
Awardee: University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, Tuscaloosa, AL
Program: Secure &Trustworthy Cyberspace
Directorate: CSE

Abstract

Everyday electronics, including keyboards, computer mice, game controllers, and smart home devices, are designed under the assumption that their physical enclosure protects the information transferred inside. This project investigates a newly identified class of vulnerabilities that challenges this assumption. By illuminating a device with a low-power radio signal from several meters away, an attacker can measure…

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