NSF award 2453883 · Oregon State University

SaTC: CORE: Small: New Directions for Client-Server Password Authentication

Final report due

28 January 2029

in 833 days · The award ends on 30 September 2028.

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award ending 2028-09-30 · Research.gov
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award ending 2028-09-30 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “at least 45 days prior to the end date”
No-cost extension notice20 Sep 2028in 703 days
award ending 2028-09-30 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “at least ten calendar days prior to the end date”
Final report due28 Jan 2029in 833 days
award ending 2028-09-30 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “no later than 120-days following the end date of the award”
Project outcomes report due28 Jan 2029in 833 days
award ending 2028-09-30 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “no later than 120 days following the end date”
Award is closed out28 Jan 2029in 833 days
award ending 2028-09-30 · Research.gov
PAPPG 24-1: “financially closed out 120 days after their expiration date”

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NSF lists this award's end date as 30 September 2028.
NSF rules say the final report is due no later than 120 days after that.
So the final report is due by 28 January 2029.

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Award card

Award number: 2453883
Period of support: 1 Oct 2025 – 30 Sep 2028
Amount: $350,000
Awardee: Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR
Program: Secure &Trustworthy Cyberspace
Directorate: CSE

Abstract

Passwords remain the most ubiquitous method for client-server authentication on the Internet, helping billions of people log in to their online accounts every day. The traditional approach to client-server password authentication is vulnerable to numerous attacks on the underlying public-key infrastructure, such as phishing attacks. In recent years, new cryptographic protocols that do not rely on the public-key…

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